The Traitor Who Would Be King

Why aren’t the Shiite provinces in Iraq enjoying a similar prosperity as the Kurds in the north? The answer is simple, there is no insurgency in Iraqi Kurdistan. The stability of these provinces has led to a huge economic boom for the Kurds.




In an interview with 60 Minutes U.S. Major General Benjamin Mixon, the Commanding Officer for Northern Iraq and Kurdistan said, “If the Iraqis simply would look north and see what the possibilities are and they do not align themselves with the extremists they could see the great potential that this country has to be a prosperous nation.”




The Shiites suffered under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship almost as much as the Kurds did. They are the largest religious denomination in Iraq and have the largest oil reserves as well. So the Shiites had the most to gain from the fall of the Sunni regime.




Under these circumstances the Shiites have strongly pushed for the same autonomy that Kurdistan enjoys, but have not been able to reap the same rewards. Instead the southern provinces on the Iranian border have been plagued with instability. The source of which comes from Iran.




Like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran also has a proxy army in Iraq. Due to the strong anti-Western stance of Iraqi cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, his Mahdi Army has received significant Iranian backing. In April of 2004 an Iranian intelligence agent who defected to England, Haj Sa’idi, revealed that the Mahdi Army received extensive training from Iran.

The Middle East Media Research Institute cited an article in which Sa’idi “estimated that about 800 - 1,200 young supporters of Al-Sadr have received military training including guerilla warfare, the production of bombs and explosives, the use of small arms, reconnoitering and espionage. The three camps were located in Qasr Shireen, ‘Ilam, and Hamid, bordering southern Iraq which is inhabited largely by Shi’a Muslims.”

Sa’idi also estimated that the financial support to Al-Sadr in the months leading up to the press release exceeded $80 million, in addition to the cost of training, equipment and clothing for the Mahdi Army.

His lust for power and the corruption of Iranian influence led Muqtada al-Sadr to betray his country. It is clear from America’s benevolent stance towards Kurdistan and the Shiite provinces where Al-Sadr has little influence, that all of the Iraqi Shiite provinces could have benefited from the U.S. financed reconstruction effort (and still can).

Al-Sadr took the Shiite majority provinces down a dark path that they didn’t need to follow. He started his aggression almost immediately after the fall of the Baathist regime. In April of 2003 pro-American Shiite cleric Majeed Al-Khoei was murdered by a mob and an arrest warrant was issued connecting Al-Sadr to the murder (the warrant was later dropped in exchange for Al-Sadr’s withdrawal from the city of Najaf).

After the Al-Khoei murder the Sadrists launched a sustained campaign to seize power from their fellow Shia through the use of force. The house of the highest ranking Shiite cleric in Iraq, the Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, was surrounded by Al-Sadr’s henchmen. They demanded that he leave the country within 48 hours or they would resort to violence. This was a particularly brazen act because Al-Sadr is only a midlevel cleric with little formal religious standing to interpret the Koran. He has to rely on a cleric living in Iran for religious authority (Ayatollah Kazem Al-Haeri). Luckily Al-Sistani was rescued by loyal tribesmen, but that was not the end of Al-Sadr’s attacks on his fellow Shiites.

The crisis deepened when he attempted to seize holy sites controlled by Al-Sistani in Karbala. Al-Sadr was decisively repulsed by the combination of U.S. firepower and the peaceful protests of the Grand Ayatollah’s supporters. Despite this defeat a couple of months later Al-Sadr attempted a more ambitious military assault to seize the seat of Shia religious authority in Najaf as well as other strategic cities. This was done while the Grand Ayatollah was out of the country for medical treatment. The attempt failed miserably and the Mahdi Army was forced to retreat back to Sadr City.

Since Iran shares a border with Iraq, the Iranians haven’t been content to sit back and let their proxy army do all of their dirty work. If you can connect the dots then the current events in Iraq can give you a hot flash of deja vu. Last year Hezbollah violated the borders of Israel to seize two hostages. Iran followed suit a couple of weeks ago with a similar operation. Iraqi waters were violated and 15 British sailors were seized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The similarities between the tactics of these two kidnapping assaults are too close to dismiss.

There are many other similarities between Iranian adventurism in Lebanon and Iraq.

– In Lebanon Hezbollah has held protests to promote the goals of its masters and in Iraq similar protests by Al-Sadr’s supporters were attempted last week, but failed to rally a sizable amount of protesters like the Beirut demonstrations.

– In Lebanon a bombing campaign is being conducted to destabilize the country and Iran’s closest ally, Syria, has been implicated in the UN’s investigation of these attacks. Iran and Syria have worked together in the past to train and equip its Lebanese proxies to conduct bombing campaigns. The most notable was the 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. In Iraq there is another bombing campaign that is also supplied and trained by Iran.

As I mentioned earlier Iran is providing Shiite militias with funding, weapons, ammunition and training. Even more disturbing is the fact that Iran is giving aid to Sunni insurgents who are killing Shiite civilians. The betrayal of their fellow Shia is a horrible example of how far the Iranian Mullahs would go to achieve their selfish goals.

The capture of two very high ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guards from the al-Quds Brigade has also highlighted the seriousness of the situation. The Brigade is responsible for arming, training and funding militant movements across the Middle East. In a separate raid five other Iranian intelligence agents were captured in the effort to break up these Iranian networks that are supporting the insurgency. Iran is committing considerable resources into destabilizing its neighbor.

With the current U.S. troop surge gaining strength circumstances have changed. Al-Sadr has gone underground and the U.S. believes that he is hiding in Iran. In response his supporters have shown that they are paying attention to current events in Washington D.C.

Taking their cue from the Democratic Party, Sadr’s supporters demanded that the Iraqi government issue a deadline for a U.S. withdrawal. Sadr is always seeking to land a decisive blow by coordinating his actions to coincide with attacks by others. In 2004 he launched his assault on Najaf at the same time that U.S. troops were engaging insurgents in Fallujah, giving the appearance of a coordinated campaign (and to a certain limited extent it was). That gamble failed and it looks like he has overextended himself once again.

Sadr loyalists warned that if a deadline for a U.S. withdrawal was not set they would quit the government. Prime Minister Al-Maliki did not budge so they followed through with their threat.

It now turns out that the Sadrist Movement is not as critical to the Prime Minister’s government as analysts have been predicting for some time. Al-Maliki responded by thanking Al-Sadr for instructing his ministers to resign so that competent independents could be appointed in their place. In one blow Sadr has lost six ministries. Agriculture, Education, Health, Transport and Tourism/Antiquities.

Analysts are warning that this could mean that Al-Sadr is planning to resume full hostilities. With the U.S. troop surge ramping up, the Iraqi security forces at their highest strength ever and no major campaigns like Fallujah as a distraction – such a move by Al-Sadr would not be wise.

There has also been a mood change in the Iraqi Prime Minister. Early in his term he held back both the U.S. and Al-Sadr from escalating tension with each other. Both sides were equally frustrated by this behavior, but there is a noticeable difference between the two. Al-Sadr continued his transgressions, while the U.S. reluctantly held back as Al-Maliki asked. Our government has proven to be a more reliable partner and the recent revelations of Iranian subterfuge has no doubt disturbed the Iraqi government.

Al-Maliki has been silently defying the Iranian government. In the months before Iran set off a huge crisis by seizing 15 British hostages the Iranians had been demanding that Al-Maliki end the UN maritime-inspection mission that was being conducted by those sailors. He refused and Iran took those hostages. It was a serious escalation that Maliki and the Coalition patiently weathered, but did not give in to Iran’s crude shakedown attempt.

To secure their borders the Iraqi government has re-imposed visas for Iranians in direct response to the infiltration of Iranian agents who have hidden among the thousands of pilgrims that travel to Iraq every day. This was sure to ruffle some feathers in Tehran.

Most importantly Al-Maliki approved the seizure of Iranian agents by U.S. forces and allowed the U.S. to clamp down on the Shiite militias.

So the Prime Minister and his government have shown their independence from Iran and the Shiite militias. If Al-Sadr wants to escalate the crisis he may find himself up against an Iraqi government that is finally tired of his brinksmanship once and for all.

Back in 2004 when the U.S. first wanted to retake the city of Fallujah the Iraqi Governing Council demanded that the U.S. halt the operation. Months later as nationwide elections approached the Council changed its mind because they realized the urgent need to secure the city for the elections. It appears that the new Iraqi government is turning a similar corner in regards to the Sadrists.

The elimination of Al-Sadr could be the answer that everyone is looking for. It will get rid of a constant irritant that has shown aggression towards every major player that he has come into contact with. That includes the U.S., fellow Shiites, the Iraqi government and the Sunni. Al-Sadr’s demise would be warmly welcomed by the Sunnis who feel that the Iraqi government is too biased in favor of the Shiites, but Al-Sadr’s fellow Shia wont miss him either.

Everybody in Iraq has something to gain from Al-Sadr’s defeat!!!